Model Checking

Looking ahead

## Model checking and formally verified software for temporal quantitative regulations

Joost J. Joosten

Universitat de Barcelona

Universiteit van Groningen Groningen, May 18



Certification in action

Model Checking

Looking ahead

## The business model of our research lab





Business focussed: from concrete to abstract

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## Nice to have or need to have?



infracción imputada y sancionada en cuanto que no se han incumplido los tiempos de descanso semanales.

En segundo lugar considera que los hechos denunciados no están suficientemente probados a efectos de poderlos considerar constitutivos de la infracción sancionada. En este apartado señala que el tacónyrão del que se han ottenido detos de arroces y oue hace cue sus resultados no rean fishies ni cientos. No se trata de una seveia o de una infuncionamiento sino de errores de fabricación, configuración y/o programación lamando la atención sobre la falta de homologación del tacónto y, especialmente, del software utilizado detro detalado del homologación del software utilizado por les autoridades para obtener y procesar los datos registrados en el tacontedo.

Se acepta lo alegado por la parte demandante en lo que se refiere a la ausencia de prueba de cargo suficiente respecto al software utilizado por la autoridad correspondiente para obtener los datos registrados en el tacógrafo por lo que, sin necesidad de analizar el resto de la fundamentarión jurídica

# Sentence Number: 30/2019, CONTENCIOSO/ADMTVO court N. 4 of Valladolid

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## Law and Code



• Law essentially discretional powers when applied

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- Law essentially discretional powers when applied
- Hence, ambiguity is needed

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- Law essentially discretional powers when applied
- Hence, ambiguity is needed
- Any automated process and in particular, any automated process in the legal sector need unambiguity
- The programmer needs to disambiguate?
- Can code be law?
- And, what if there's an error in the code?

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## Doubtful results

### III - Les formules de calculs

### DE L'APL ET DES AL

### Secteur locatif ordinaire

Depuis la réforme intervenue le 1<sup>st</sup> janvier 2001, le montant de l'aide est obtenu par application de la même formule en AL et en APL (cf. article D. 823-76 du CCH).

### APL ou AL = L+C-Pp

#### Logements-foyers

 Le montant de l'APL foyer est obtenu par application de la formule (cf. article D. 832-24 dv CCH):

### APL = K [E - E0]

Avec application de deux barèmes, APL 1 foyer et APL 2 foyer (cf. articles D. 832-25 et D. 832-26 du CCH)

Le montant de l'AL est obtenu selon la formule (cf. article D. 842-15 du CCH) :

### AL = K [L + C - L0]

### Accession

Le montant de l'APL et de l'AL est obtenu par application de la même formule (cf. articles D. 832-10 et D. 842-6) du CCH :

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 Bonus payment system of the French Army: Louvois/SourceSolde

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- In 2012: 465 M € incorrect payments

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- Bonus payment system of the French Army: Louvois/SourceSolde
- In 2012: 465 M € incorrect payments
- It left some soldiers and their families without any income at all for months!

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## Closer to (my) house: Civio vs Bosco

This article belongs to the debate » The Rule of Law versus the Rule of the Algorithm

02 April 2022

### The Paradox of Efficiency: Frictions Between Law and Algorithms

On the 13th of January 2022, a Spanish Administrative court ruled in favour of algorithmic opacity. Fundación Civio, an independent foundation that monitors and accounts public authorities, <u>reported</u> that an algorithm used by the government was committing errors.<sup>13</sup> BOSCO, the name of the application which contained the algorithm, was implemented by the Spanish public administration to more efficiently identify citizens eligible for grants to pay electricity bills. Meanwhile, <u>Civio designed a web app</u> to inform citizens whether they would be entitled for this grant.<sup>23</sup> Thousands of citizens used this application and some of them reported that, while Civio web app suggested



### Ana Valdivia

Dr Ana Valdivia is a Postdoctoral Researcher at King's College London (ERC Security Flows). She examines how algorithms impact on people's life from a technical, political, and legal perspective.



### Javier de la Cueva

Javier de la Cueva is a lawyer, lecturer and researcher in topics related to open knowledge, ethics and the digital world.

Explore posts related to this: Algorithmic Efficiency, Algorithmic Justice, Rule of Law, Rule of the Algorithm

The Bosco computer program : errors in the computation of the social welfare bonuses

Least requirement: access to source code

In France it is mandatory to publish source code of software that is used in public administration.

However, access to source code will not resolve all problems

J.J. Joosten (UB)

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## Evidencias dudosas

• In three law-suits in the USA, the defence requested to **open the proprietary source code to the jury** of DNA sequencing software since there were some doubts.

• STRmix



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- Again, access to the source code will not solve all problems!



Certification in action

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### What is certification?



 Is it just a matter of trust? (combined with some sanity checks and experience)

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## What is certification?



- Is it just a matter of trust? (combined with some sanity checks and experience)
- Certificate  $\implies$  something is certain

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- Is it just a matter of trust? (combined with some sanity checks and experience)
- Certificate  $\implies$  something is certain
- Verify ⇒ something is veridical

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## The impossibility of unrestricted certification



Alan Turing

• A mathematical theorem:

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## The impossibility of unrestricted certification



Alan Turing

- A mathematical theorem:
- Unrestricted certification is impossible.

## Restricted certification is possible

We call a program P a *universal certifier* (wrt its language) when P takes two inputs

- ① another program Q in a language compatible with P and,
- ② a specification S in a language compatible with P that describes the behaviour of the program Q;
- and, given two inputs Q and S, the program P outputs:
  - "YES" if the program Q does what is said by S and, it will ouput
  - "NO" if the program Q does something different as that what is claimed by S.

### Theorem

There does not exist a universal certifier. This holds for any reasonable class of languages.

## Formally verified software

### Components of formally verified/certified software

- Σ A Specification: a non-ambiguous mathematical description of the input-output behaviour of the software
- $\Pi$  Implementation: the code, the software, implementing the algorithm that does the work.
- $\Delta$  ~ Proof: a mathematical proof that the program  $\Pi$  functions as claimed by  $\Sigma$

The specification  $\Sigma$  is written in a formal language (in our case, the language of dependent types of the Coq proof assistant). This begs the question: How to make the specification more accessible to the general/judicial public?

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### What is verification?

# **Formal verification**



Slides FV: González Bedmar

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## What is verification?

# **Formal verification**



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## What is verification?



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## What is verification?



Certification in action

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## What is verification?



Certification in action ••••••••••••••

## Seven years of research in Barcelona

÷ C	C	8	www.fbg.ub.edu/in/inews/ioftware-faile-0-ub-project-to-create-an-c 🛛 🏠 👘 🗇 🔬 🔟 » 🚍
	New	/8	
4L.,*		á <b>r</b>	'Software Fallo 0', a UB project to create
			an error-free software system
= )	1	10	All software contains bugs; even the software that controls the aeronautical or military industry has bugs



in its final version. This situation is particularly troubling because of the increasing dependence on software of key processes such as computer voting mechanisms, medical technologies, and applications that decide whether or not a person complies with the law. A team from the University of Barcelona participates in a four-year project that promotes a new paradigm for the software industry: the development.



Research aroups of the ŭв



Dr. Joost J. Joosten (mathematical logic, team Ana Borges (mathematical logic) Joaquim Casals Buñuel

### PROMETHEUSS GRUP

#### Software unreliability and the legal system

Software malfunction can appear in one or several layers of the software development cycle, including: natural language specifications, technical specifications, formal specifications, coding, compilation, installation, and execution. The consequences of software malfunction in legal and administrative settings arguably imply the violation of legal principles, loss of valuable resources, attacks on civil rights (such as well-documented cases of automated racial discrimination), and degradation of legal systems. Also, in the future as well as in the present, it may aggravate the societal loss of confidence in technology and in government alike. Legally binding decisions taken based on data produced by software, or even decisions which are automated outright, very rarely acknowledge the existence of several crucial potential problems inherent to the nature

Covenant between the University of Barcelona (FBG), Formal Vindications S.L. & Guretruck S.L.

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### Three weeks ago in Barcelona



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## Time library



# Time formats and managers



Most important feature: formally verified!

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### What is certification?



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Around one-thousand times more expensive!
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### A central problem



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### Public certification versus formal verification



### Catala: A Shortcut For Legal Expert System Certification

### The Usual Way to Produce Verified Software

Using Mireia Gonzáles Bedmar's conceptual framework from yesterday's presentation:



Catala's approach:



Slides Catala: Merigoux

8

### 1 Catala: A Language Reviewable by lawyers

### US Tax Code, Section 132, (c)(1) Qualified employee discount

The term "qualified employee discount" means any employee discount with respect to qualified property or services to the extent such discount does not exceed— (A) in the case of property, the gross profit percentage of the price at which the property is being offered by the employer to customers

```
scope QualifiedEmployeeDiscount :
definition qualified_employee_discount
under condition is_property consequence equals
if employee_discount >$ customer_price *$ gross_profit_percentage then
    customer_price *$ gross_profit_percentage
    else employee_discount
```

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### Can code be the law?

### **TENSION TABLE:**

### Computable laws:

#### Language, software paradigm and legal principles

	Specification Language	Programmi paradign	ng າ	Legal Principles				
			Legal Certainty	Accountability	Contestability			
More accurate and exact but less undertandable for the general public	Natural Language	Not Formally Verified	Decisions will probably not be consistent with the established legal framework. The text will be accessible and comprehensible to the public and authorities.	Automated decision won't be reliable and explainability will be difficult: the software is not comprehensible to the public, challenging the principle of transparency.	Right to contest turns almost impossible since authorities can't explain software decisions, which will be unreliable.			
	Technical Language	Not Formally Verified	Decisions will likely not be consistent with the established legal framework. The text will be less comprehensible to public and authorities.	Automated decision will be barely reliable and explainability will be difficult: the software is not comprehensible to the public, challenging the principle of transparency.	Right to contest turns almost impossible since authorities can't explain software decisions, which will be mostly unreliable.			
	Formal Language	Not Formally Werified	Decisions will probably be consistent with the established legal framework. The text will only be accessible to experts.	Automated decision will be quite reliable and explainability will be difficult: the software is not comprehensible to the public, challenging the principle of transparency.	Right to contest turns almost impossible since authorities can't explain software decisions, yet they will probably be working according to the law			
	Formal Language	Formally Verified	Decisions will be consistent with established legal framework. The text will only be accessible to experts	Automated decision will be reliable and explainability will be difficult, but it will be guaranteed that the software is the exact reproduction of its specification	Right to contest will be difficult since authorities can't explain software decisions, yet those are working according to the law			

On software certification

Certification in action

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### Further benefits of formalisation



We proved that the labelling is not *shift-invariant*!

## Some regulations regarding weekly rest periods

Regulation (EC) No 561/2006

§8.6. In any two consecutive weeks, a driver shall take at least:

- two regular weekly rest periods [of at least 45 hours], or
- one regular weekly rest period and one reduced weekly rest period of at least 24 hours. However, the reduction shall be compensated by an equivalent period of rest taken en bloc before the end of the third week following the week in question.

A weekly rest period shall start no later than at the end of six 24-hour periods from the end of the previous weekly rest period.

§8.9. A weekly rest period that falls in two weeks may be counted in either week, but not in both.

On software certification

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### Let's break it down...

• Regular weekly rest:  $\geq$  45 hours

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- Regular weekly rest:  $\geq$  45 hours
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- Every week must have a regular or reduced weekly rest
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- Any reduced rest must be compensated by a continuous block in the following three weeks

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### Combinatorics of rest assignments

Can we assign a week to each rest period so that each week is assigned to at least one rest period?



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### Combinatorics of rest assignments

Can we assign a week to each rest period so that each week is assigned to at least one rest period?



In principle this is an NP problem (assign 0 or 1 to each rest period according to whether it should belong to the earlier week or the later week).

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### Non-locality of compensations



Illegal

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Looking ahead

### Non-locality of compensations



Illegal



Legal

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Looking ahead

### Non-locality of compensations



Illegal



Legal



### This can be iterated indefinitely: non-locality

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Looking ahead

### Lab activities

• Regulation analysis via logical/mathematical analysis

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- Regulation analysis via logical/mathematical analysis
  - Is the regulation consistent?

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- Develop general purpose models with the above considerations taken into account so that zero-error software scales.

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- Implement software in a ZERO-ERROR fashion using proof assistants.
- Develop general purpose models with the above considerations taken into account so that zero-error software scales.
- Provide verified software with a dialogue fragment that enables a possible rudimentary dialogue between the user and the software about the software's behaviour

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### Lab activities

• Develop explanatory certificates by

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- Develop explanatory certificates by
  - choosing ontologies of the right granularity to define semi-formal language

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# The central computational problem of algorithmic law

(Work and slides with Moritz Müller)

Need to formalize activity sequences and laws

- formalize activity sequences are words w ∈ Σ\* over a finite alphabet Σ
   e.g, dddrrw formalizes 6 minutes of activities in Σ = {d, r, w}.
- formalize a law by a sentence in a suitable logic *L*.

Need algorithm that decides the computational problem  $MC(\Sigma^*, L)$ Input: a word  $w \in \Sigma^*$  and a sentence  $\varphi \in L$ Problem: is w legal according to  $\varphi$ , i.e.  $w \models \varphi$ ?

 $MC(\Sigma^*, L)$  is a formal model for algorithmic law (on activity sequences). Question For which L is it good?

# Candidate: monadic second order logic MSO

#### Starting point

Borges, Conejero, Fernández-Duque, González, Joosten.

To drive or not to drive: A logical and computational analysis of European transport regulations. Information and Computation 280, 2021.

- naturally formalizes Regulation 561.
- model-checking in time  $f(|\varphi|) \cdot |w|$ , Parameterized Complexity where  $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$  is some computable function.
- but f grows very fast:

Theorem (Frick, Grohe 04) Assume  $P \neq NP$ . Then  $MC(\Sigma^*, MSO)$  is not decidable in time

 $f(|\varphi|) \cdot |w|^{O(1)}$ 

for elementary  $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ .

Hence MSO is not sufficiently tractable.

## Candidate: linear time temporal logic LTL

Model-checking in time  $O(|\varphi| \cdot |w|)$ , but not sufficiently expressive and not sufficiently succinct (BRFB21)

**Example** Article 6.2: The weekly driving time shall not exceed 56 hours

Straightforwardly formalized over words of length 1w: disjunction of

$$\bigwedge_{d \leq D} \left(\bigwedge_{r_d \leq i < \ell_{d+1}} \bigcirc^i \neg d \land \bigwedge_{\ell_d \leq i < r_d} \bigcirc^i d\right)$$

for all  $D \leq 1w$  and all  $r_0 := 0 \leq \ell_1 < r_1 < \dots < \ell_D < r_D < \ell_{D+1} := 1w$  with  $\sum_{1 \leq j \leq D} (r_j - \ell_j) \leq 56h$ This has  $> \binom{7 \cdot 24 \cdot 60}{56 \cdot 60} > 10^{2784}$  many disjuncts. Warning

Algorithmic laws could use large constants for time constraints. Model-checking complexity should scale well with them.

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Formally Verified Software

# Which $MC(\Sigma^*, L)$ are good models for algorithmic law?

#### Tractability

sufficiently fast model-checkers fine-grained complexity analysis: parameterized complexity theory important parameter: large time constants in law

Expressivity

test case: formalize Regulation 561

#### Naturality

readable sentences sufficiently succinct

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#### Stopwatch automata SWA: syntax

#### Stopwatch automaton $\mathbbm{A}$

- *Q* finite set of states including start, accept
- X finite set of stopwatches
- $\lambda$  maps  $q\in Q$  to  $\lambda(q)\in \Sigma$
- $\beta$  maps  $x \in X$  to bound  $\beta(x) \in \mathbb{N}$
- $\zeta$  is the set of  $(x, q) \in X \times Q$  such that x is active in q

 $\Delta$  is the set of transitions  $(q, g, \alpha, q')$ 

where  $q, q' \in Q$ , g is a guard,  $\alpha$  is an action.

Assignment  $\xi$  maps  $x \in X$  to  $\xi(x) \le \beta(x)$ Guard g is a set of assignments Action  $\alpha$  maps assignments to assignments

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#### Stopwatch automata SWA: semantics

Transition system of A  
configurations 
$$(q, \xi)$$
  
switch edges  $(q, \xi) \xrightarrow{0} (q', \xi')$   
whenever  $(q, g, \alpha, q') \in \Delta, \xi \in g, \xi' = \alpha(\xi)$   
stay edges  $(q, \xi) \xrightarrow{t} (q, \xi')$   
where  $\xi'$  increases  $\xi(x)$  for  $x$  active in  $q$  to min $\{\xi(x)+t, \beta(x)\}$   
Computation  $(q_0, \xi_0) \xrightarrow{t_0} (q_1, \xi_1) \xrightarrow{t_1} (q_2, \xi_2) \xrightarrow{t_2} \cdots \xrightarrow{t_{\ell-1}} (q_{\ell}, \xi_{\ell})$   
reads  $w := \lambda(q_0)^{t_0} \lambda(q_1)^{t_1} \cdots \lambda(q_{\ell-1})^{t_{\ell-1}}$   
accepts if  $q_0 = start, \xi_0 \equiv 0, q_{\ell} = accept, q_i \neq accept$  for  $i < \ell$ .

Model Checking

#### Example: continuous driving

Article 7 (1st part): After a driving period of four and a half hours a driver shall take an uninterrupted break of not less than 45 minutes,...



 $(drive, 00) \xrightarrow{3} (drive, 30) \xrightarrow{0} (break, 30) \xrightarrow{2} (break, 32) \xrightarrow{0} (work, 32) \xrightarrow{0} (break, 30)$ (break, 30) reads dddrr

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Model Checking

# Automaton that accepts exactly the legal words according to Reg. 561



12 states > 100 transitions 34 stopwatches 23 are nowhere active: *bits counters registers*  On software certification

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#### > 100 transitions



Model Checking

# Expressivity and model-checking

#### Theorem

A set of words is accepted by an SWA iff it is definable in MSO. **Theorem** 

There is an algorithm that decides Input: stopwatch automaton  $\mathbb{A}$  and a word w over  $\Sigma$ Problem: does  $\mathbb{A}$  accepts w ?

in time

$$O\big(|\mathbb{A}|^2\cdot {t^{\mathsf{x}}}\cdot |w|\big)$$

where

- $t := largest stopwatch bound of \mathbb{A}$
- x := number of stopwatches of  $\mathbb{A}$

Model Checking

## Consistency-checking

#### Theorem

There is an algorithm that decides Input: SWAs  $\mathbb{A}, \mathbb{B}$ Problem: is there a word accepted by both  $\mathbb{A}$  and  $\mathbb{B}$ ?

in time

 $O(|\mathbb{A}|^3 \cdot |\mathbb{B}|^3 \cdot t^x \cdot s^y)$ 

where

- t := largest stopwatch bound of A
  x := number of stopwatches of A
  s := largest stopwatch bound of B
- y := number of stopwatches of  $\mathbb B$

# Scheduling

#### Theorem

```
There is an algorithm that decides

Input: SWA \mathbb{A}, letter a \in \Sigma, word w over \Sigma, n \in \mathbb{N}

Problem: compute length n word v over \Sigma such that

\mathbb{A} accepts wv

v maximizes \#_a(v)
```

in time

$$O\big(|\mathbb{A}|^2\cdot t^{\times}\cdot (|w|+n)\big)$$

where

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#### Lower bound

Know:  $MC(\Sigma^*, SWA)$  decidable in time  $O(|\mathbb{A}|^2 \cdot t^x \cdot |w|)$ Doubt: Is  $t^x$  tolerable? Can it be improved? Interesting instances have large t and small x. Question: replace  $t^x$  by  $100^{100 \cdot x} \cdot t^{100}$ ?

#### Theorem

Assume FPT  $\neq$  W[1]. Let  $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$  be a computable function. Then MC( $\Sigma^*$ , SWA) cannot be decided in time  $(|\mathbb{A}| \cdot f(x) \cdot t \cdot |w|)^{O(1)}$ .

Question: Can we hardwire large constants in the data structure using Hybrid Modal Logic?

• Study if data-representation can improve complexity of model checking;

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## Thanks

