

Provability Logics and Applications

Day 1

Provability as modality

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ESSLLI Tutorial, Opole

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- ▶ As $\text{Prv}_{PA}(\varphi) \in \Sigma_1$ we have

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- ▶ By provable Σ_1 completeness: $\text{Prv}_{\text{PA}}(\text{Prv}_{\text{PA}}(\lambda))$, that is $\text{Prv}_{\text{PA}}(\neg \lambda)$

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- ▶ Thus, by necessitation and distribution

$$\Box_{\text{PA}} \chi \rightarrow (\Box_{\text{PA}} \Box_{\text{PA}} \chi \rightarrow \Box_{\text{PA}} \psi)$$

- ▶ By transitivity $\Box_{\text{PA}} \chi \rightarrow (\Box_{\text{PA}} \chi \rightarrow \Box_{\text{PA}} \psi)$
which is just $\Box_{\text{PA}} \chi \rightarrow \Box_{\text{PA}} \psi$
- ▶ By assumption

$$\Box_{\text{PA}} \chi \rightarrow \psi \tag{1}$$

- ▶ Thus χ , whence by Nec. $\Box \chi$ and MP on (1) we get ψ



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